

three applications of model finding

Daniel Jackson · Tel Aviv, March 7, 2012

based on work with

Eunsuk Kang, Aleks Milicevic & Joe Near



model finding

finding a graph coloring

condition on adjacency and coloring:

all $a, b \mid a \rightarrow b$ **in** adj **implies** $a.color \neq b.color$

free
variable

free
variable

or, equivalently:

no $adj.color \ \& \ color$

formalizing types:

some


disj Node, Color: **set** univ,

$adj: Node \rightarrow Node,$

$color: Node \rightarrow$ **one** Color |

no $adj.color \ \& \ color$

an instance:



alloy analyzer

Alloy Analyzer 4.2 (build date: 2012-02-28 12:29 EST)

```
abstract sig Node {
  adj: set Node,
  color: Color
}
fact {
  no color & adj.color
}
abstract sig Color {}
lone sig Red, Green, Blue extends Color {}
pred connected { Node -> Node in ^adj}
run {#Node = 5 and connected and #Node.color = 3} for 5

sig RedNode extends Node {{color= Red}}
sig GreenNode extends Node {{color= Green}}
sig BlueNode extends Node {{color= Blue}}
```

Executing "Run run\$1 for 5"
Solver=minisatprover(jni) Bitwidth=0 MaxSeq=0 SkolemDepth=4 Symmetry=20
1309 vars. 64 primary vars. 2138 clauses. 161ms.
Instance found. Predicate is consistent. 22ms.

Executing "Run run\$1 for 5"
Solver=minisatprover(jni) Bitwidth=0 MaxSeq=0 SkolemDepth=4 Symmetry=20
1092 vars. 54 primary vars. 1795 clauses. 81ms.
Instance found. Predicate is consistent. 10ms.

Executing "Run run\$1 for 5"
Solver=minisatprover(jni) Bitwidth=0 MaxSeq=0 SkolemDepth=4 Symmetry=20
1309 vars. 64 primary vars. 2138 clauses. 44ms.
Instance found. Predicate is consistent. 39ms.


(tau3) Run run\$1 for 5

Projection: none

adj: 13


```
graph TD
  Root(( )) --> G1((1))
  Root --> G0((0))
  G1 --> R1((1))
  G1 --> R0((0))
  G0 --> R1
  G0 --> R0
```

how alloy works




partial instances

Petersen graph




a coloring



	$n0$	$n1$	$n2$	$n3$...
$n0$	0	1	0	0	...
$n1$	0	0	1	0	
$n2$	0	0	0	1	
$n3$	1	0	0	0	

	$c0$	$c1$	$c2$	$c3$...
$n0$	$c00$	$c01$	$c02$	$c03$...
$n1$	$c10$	$c11$	$c12$	$c13$	
$n2$	$c20$	$c21$	$c22$	$c23$	
$n3$	$c30$	$c31$	$c32$	$c33$	

kodkod architecture



[Torlak07]

[Torlak08]

some applications of model finding

checking theorems

find a refutation

eg, Nitpick for Isabelle/HOL



software update

find packages to install

eg, Eclipse's Equinox P2



configuring networks

find router settings

eg, Telcordia's ConfigAssure

A screenshot of the Configuration Assurance software interface. The window title is "Configuration Assurance". The menu bar includes "File", "Configuration", "Constraints", and "Debug". There is a "Solve" button and a checkbox for "Use Remote Solver". The main area displays a table with columns for Node, Interface, Address, and Mask. The table contains data for various nodes and their interfaces, including fwa, fwb, host1-4, rexa, rexb, rina, and rina. A sidebar on the right shows a tree view of configuration elements like "client_profile", "ipAddress", "static_route", "fw", "hsrp", "ipSecTunnel", and "flow". The solver is identified as "MiniSatProver".

Node	Interface	Address	Mask	X	V
fwa	bge0	121.096.062.248	13		
fwa	bge1	121.096.099.251	4		
fwb	bge0	121.096.032.233	13		
fwb	bge1	121.096.099.245	4		
host1	Ethernet_0	121.096.225.253	3		
host2	Ethernet_0	121.096.142.096	14		
host3	Ethernet_0	121.096.020.020	12		
host4	Ethernet_0	121.096.220.007	2		
rexa	FastEthernet0_1	121.096.032.128	13		
rexa	FastEthernet1_0	121.096.001.121	7		
rexb	FastEthernet0_1	121.096.063.095	13		
rexb	FastEthernet1_0	121.096.001.000	7		
rina	Ethernet2_0	121.096.225.250	3		
rina	Ethernet2_1	121.096.148.000	14		
rina	Ethernet2_2	121.096.022.177	12		
rina	Ethernet2_3	121.096.220.004	2		
rina	FastEthernet0_0	121.096.099.248	4		

why alloy/kodkod?

	Kodkod	IDP1.3	Paradox2.3	DarwinFM	Mace4
language					
first order logic	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆
relational algebra	◆	◇	◇	◇	◇
partial models	◆	◆	◇	◇	◇
inductive definitions	◇	◆	◇	◇	◇
types	◆	◆	◇	◇	◇
bitvector arithmetic	◆	◇	◇	◇	◇
model finding					
partial models	◆	◆	◇	◇	◇
inductive definitions	◇	◆	◇	◇	◇
symmetry breaking	◆	◇	◆	◆	◆
high-arity relations	◇	◇	◇	◆	◇
nested quantifiers	◇	◇	◆	◆	◆
core extraction					
minimal core	◆	◇	◇	◇	◇

- ◆ full support
- ◇ partial support
- ◇ no support

#0

design analysis

zave on chord

Three features that distinguish Chord from many other peer-to-peer lookup protocols are its simplicity, provable correctness, and provable performance.

Ion Stoica et al. Chord: A Scalable Peer to Peer Lookup Service for Internet Applications, SIGCOMM 2001 (also TON, 2003)

Modeling and analysis have shown that the Chord routing protocol is not correct according to its specification. Furthermore, not one of the six logical properties claimed as invariant is invariantly maintained by the protocol.

Pamela Zave. Invariant-Based Verification of Routing Protocols: The Case of Chord, 2009

akhawe+ on web security

generic model of web security

HTTP, certificates, cookies, script contexts
about 2,000 lines of Alloy

shown below. More explicitly, a browser attaches a cookie to an `HTTPRequest` only if the cookie was set in a previous `HTTPResponse` and the servers of the `HTTPRequest` and `HTTPResponse` have the same DNS label.

```
fact {
  all areq:HTTPRequest | {
    areq.from in Browser
    hasCookie[areq]
  } implies all acookie: reqCookies[areq] |
  some aresp: getBrowserTrans[areq].resp | {
    aresp.host.dnslabel = areq.host.dnslabel
    acookie in respCookies[aresp]
    happensBeforeOrdering[aresp, areq]
  }
}
```


results

Case Study	Lines of new code	No. of clauses	CNF gen. time (sec)	CNF solve time (sec)
Origin Header	25	977,829	26.45	19.47
CORS	80	584,158	24.07	82.76
Referer Validation	35	974,924	30.75	9.06
HTML5 Forms	20	976,174	27.67	73.54
WebAuth	214	355,093	602.4	35.44

applied to 5 case studies
in each, found vulnerabilities
2 known, 3 unknown

sample vulnerability
referrer validation fails on redirects

falling over the cliff



more examples: alloy.mit.edu

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alloy: a language & tool for relational models

about alloy

Alloy is a language for describing structures and a tool for exploring them. It has been used in a wide range of [applications](#) from finding holes in security mechanisms to designing telephone switching networks.

An Alloy model is a collection of constraints that describes (implicitly) a set of structures, for example: all the possible security configurations of a web application, or all the possible topologies of a switching network. Alloy's tool, the [Alloy Analyzer](#), is a solver that takes the constraints of a model and finds structures that satisfy them. It can be used both to explore the model by generating sample structures, and to check properties of the model by generating counterexamples. Structures are displayed graphically, and their appearance can be customized for the domain at hand.

At its core, the Alloy language is a simple but expressive logic based on the notion of relations, and was inspired by the Z specification language and Tarski's relational calculus. Alloy's syntax is designed to make it easy to build models incrementally, and was influenced by modeling languages (such as the object models of OMT and UML). Novel features of Alloy include a rich subtype facility for factoring out common features and a uniform and powerful syntax for navigation expressions.

The Alloy Analyzer works by reduction to SAT. Version 4 was a complete rewrite that included [Kodkod](#), a new model finding engine that optimizes the reduction, and a new front end.

news

[ASM, Alloy, B and Z Conference](#): papers now due January 22!

Research programmer position [available](#) on Alloy project!

Revised edition of book now out!
Available from [MIT Press](#).



#1

declarative programming

work by Aleks Milicevic

sudoku

problem

fill in the empty cells so that
all rows, columns and squares contain 1..9

6			1		8	2		3
	2			4			9	
8		3			5	4		
5		4	6		7			9
	3						5	
7			8		3	1		2
		1	7			9		6
	8			3			2	
3		2	9		4			5

specifying solve

```
public class Sudoku {  
    private int [][] grid = new int [9][9];  
  
    @Ensures ({  
        "all row in {0..8} | this.grid[row][int] = {1..9}",  
        "all col in {0..8} | this.grid[int][col] = {1..9}",  
        "all r , c in {0, 1, 2} |  
        this.grid[{r*3..r*3+2}][{c*3..c*3+2}] = {1..9}"  
    })  
    @Modifies("this.grid[int].elems | _<2> = 0")  
    public void solve() { ... }  
  
    public static void main(String[] args) {  
        Sudoku s = new Sudoku();  
        s.grid[0][3] = 1; ...; s.grid[8][8] = 5;  
        s.solve( );  
    }  
}
```

6			1		8	2		3
	2			4			9	
8		3			5	4		
5		4	6		7			9
	3						5	
7			8		3	1		2
		1	7			9		6
	8			3			2	
3		2	9		4			5

implementing solve

```
public class Sudoku {
    private int [][] grid = new int [9][9];

    @Ensures ({
        "all row in {0..8} | this.grid[row][int] = {1..9}",
        "all col in {0..8} | this.grid[int][col] = {1..9}",
        "all r , c in {0, 1, 2} |
            this.grid[{r*3..r*3+2}][{c*3..c*3+2}] = {1..9}"
    })
    @Modifies("this.grid[int].elems | _<2> = 0")
    public void solve() { Squander.exe(this); }

    public static void main(String[] args) {
        Sudoku s = new Sudoku();
        s.grid[0][3] = 1; ...; s.grid[8][8] = 5;
        s.solve( );
    }
}
```

6			1		8	2		3
	2			4			9	
8		3			5	4		
5		4	6		7			9
	3						5	
7			8		3	1		2
		1	7			9		6
	8			3			2	
3		2	9		4			5

printing the result


```
public class Sudoku {
    private int [][] grid = new int [9][9];

    @Ensures ({
        "all row in {0..8} | this.grid[row][int] = {1..9}",
        "all col in {0..8} | this.grid[int][col] = {1..9}",
        "all r , c in {0, 1, 2} |
            this.grid[{r*3..r*3+2}][{c*3..c*3+2}] = {1..9}"
    })
    @Modifies("this.grid[int].elems | _<2> = 0")
    public void solve() { Squander.exe(this); }

    public static void main(String[] args) {
        Sudoku s = new Sudoku();
        s.grid[0][3] = 1; ...; s.grid[8][8] = 5;
        s.solve( );
        System.out.println(s);
    }
}
```

6			1		8	2		3
	2			4			9	
8		3			5	4		
5		4	6		7			9
	3						5	
7			8		3	1		2
		1	7			9		6
	8			3			2	
3		2	9		4			5



Java heap



code spec

```
"all row in {0..8} | this.grid[row][int] = {1..9}",
"all col in {0..8} | this.grid[int][col] = {1..9}",
"all r , c in {0, 1, 2} |
  this.grid[{r*3..r*3+2}][{c*3..c*3+2}] = {1..9}"
```

heap updates



bounds

	n0	n1	n2	n3
n0	0	1	r02	r03
n1	r10	0	1	r13
n2	r20	r21	0	1
n3	r30	0	r32	0

alloy formula

```
all r: Row | grid.Row.Int =
  range(1,9)
```

instance

	n0	n1	n2	n3
n0	0	1	1	1
n1	0	0	1	1
n2	0	0	0	1
n3	0	0	0	0


assignment

```
1,23,44,34,23,
45,46, 87
```

CNF


```
1,23,45
34,23,45,46
1,3,4,7, 1,23,45
34,23,45,46, 87
1,3,4,7
```

SAT




performance


n-queens



hamiltonian path, none



hamiltonian path, some



refinements

handling libraries


eg, Java collections

specs, spec fields, invariants

minimizing universe size

exploit type information in heap

map objects of different types to same atom



binary search tree

```
public class BalancedTree {  
    private Node root;
```

```
@SpecField("this.nodes: set Node | this.nodes = this.root.*(left+right) – null")
```

```
@Invariant({
```

```
    "all x: this.left.*(left+right) – null | x.key < this.key",
```

```
    "all x: this . right .*(left+right) – null | x.key > this.key",
```

```
    "all n: this.nodes | (#n.left.^(left+right) – #n.right.^(left+right)) in {-1, 0, 1}")
```

```
public class Node {  
    private Node left, right;  
    private int key;  
}
```

```
@Requires("z.key !in this.nodes.key")
```

```
@Ensures ("this.nodes = @old(this.nodes) + z")
```

```
@Modifies("this.root, this.nodes.left | <1>= null, this.nodes.right | <1>= null")
```


```
public void insertNode(Node z) { Squander.exe(this, z); }
```

```
}
```

defines *nodes*

tree is balanced

course scheduler



existing app
uses Alloy, but
embedded by hand

new version
Squander code

numbers
1500 lines of code
replaced by 30 of spec
2000 objects on heap
runs in 5s instead of 1s

related work

Kaplan [Koskal, Kuncak, Suter]
constraints integrated with Scala

Jeeves [Yang, Yessenov, Solar-Lezama]
declarative privacy policies enforced at runtime

PBnJ [Samimi, Aung, Millstein]
falling back to executable specs

data structure repair [Zaeem, Khurshid]
using contracts and Kodkod

#2

verification of web apps

work by Joseph Near

code checking by refutation

represent code & spec as formulas

$\text{Code}(s,s')$

$\text{Spec}(s,s')$

find instances of

$\text{Code}(s,s')$ **and not** $\text{Spec}(s,s')$

guarantees

every instance is a valid counterexample
but may miss bugs due to small scope

observations about web apps

“CRUD”

little control structure
relational data

not just functionality
security critical
also relational, data-centric

unit tests

of controller actions
eg in RSpec

disciplined layering
data access factored out

Rubicon specs


```
it "user included in list of users" do  
  user = Factory(:user)  
  get :index  
  assigns[:users].should include user  
end
```

RSpec test

```
it "all users included in list of users" do  
  User.forall do |user|  
    get :index  
    assigns[:users].should include(user)  
  end  
end
```

Rubicon spec

how Rubicon works



stubbing active record

```
classes = ActiveRecord::Base.descendants classes.each do |klass|
  metaclass = class << klass; self; end
  metaclass.send(:define_method, :all,
lambda {|*args|
    if $symbolic_execution then ExprApp.new(:all, [self])
    else super end})
end
```

User.all **evaluates to**

in Rails: list of database records

in Rails+Rubicon: ExprApp(User)

stubbing subclass methods

```
klass.column_names.each do |name|  
  klass.send(:define_method, name.to_sym,  
    lambda {|*args|  
      if $symbolic_execution then  
        ExprApp.new(:field_get, [self, name.to_sym])  
      else super end})  
end
```

some_user.id **evaluates to**

in Rails: 1, eg

in Rails+Rubicon: ExprApp(**:field_get**, some_user, **:id**)

sample spec & action

```
class UsersController < ApplicationController
def profile
  @current_user = User.find_by_id(session[:user_id])
  all_posts = Micropost.where(:user => @current_user.friends)
  @posts = all_posts.select do |post|
    (post.privacy == 'friends') |
    (post.privacy == 'public')
  end
end
end
```

```
it "all users see only their friends' posts" do
  User.forall do |user|
    session[:user_id] = user.id
    get :profile
    Micropost.forall do |post|
      ((post.privacy == 'friends') & (!user.friends.include? post.user)).
      implies do
        assigns[:posts].should_not include post
      end
    end
  end
end
end
```

sample verification condition

```
Implies(  
  And(symbolic_post.privacy = 'friends',  
    Not(include(symbolic_user.friends, symbolic_post.user))),  
  Not(include(Query(Micropost,  
    And(include(:user, symbolic_user.friends),  
      Or(=(:privacy, 'friends')), =(:privacy, 'public'))))),  
  symbolic_post))
```

converted to:

```
all u: User, p: Micropost |  
  p.privacy = friends and not p.user in u.friends  
implies p not in  
  { p': Micropost |  
    p.user in u.friends  
    and (p'.privacy = friends or p'.privacy = public)}
```

results to date

wrote specs

5 open-source apps

c.150 specs, 1kloc

ran analyses

average about 3s in scope of 5

founds bugs

2 bugs found in Fat Free CRM

one spurious

one serious security bug

Fat Free CRM

The screenshot shows the Fat Free CRM web application running in a browser. The browser address bar shows the URL `http://localhost:3000/opportunities/37a98572-ade8-102c-b57b-6261c0a0e289`. The application header includes the title "Fat Free CRM" and a navigation menu with items: "Dashboard", "Tasks", "Campaigns", "Leads", "Accounts", "Contacts", and "Opportunities". The user is logged in as "Heather" and has links for "Quick find", "Preferences", "Profile", and "Logout".

The main content area is divided into three sections:

- Opportunity Summary:** A table showing details for the opportunity "Quibusdam quasi unde".

Stage:	Analysis
Close date:	Jul 21
Days left:	29
Probability:	80%
Amount:	\$800,000
Discount:	N/A
Weighted amount:	\$640,000
Assigned to:	Elizabeth Emul...
Account:	Volkman-Gerhold
Campaign:	The quicker pi...
- Notes:** A list of notes from other users. Each note includes the user's name, the time since it was posted, and the text of the note.
 - Dan Debugger** about 1 month ago: Voluptates ea tenetur ducimus quis cum iure aspernatur consequatur. Doloribus facere non minima quis maxime corporis aliquid quia. Eligendi quas et doloremque maxime. Pariatur consequatur quia error est totam ipsam.
 - Frank Formatter** about 1 month ago: Praesentium repellendus dicta quibusdam. Ullam voluptatum soluta tenetur et. Ut similique et illo occaecati accusantium.
 - Heather Hash** about 1 month ago: Id tempora commodi dolor dolores eum est. Quibusdam modi in laborum sed eos non. A aut totam tempore amet qui veniam et et. Et ad ut et.
 - Frank Formatter** about 1 month ago: Dolor est et et natus repellendus fugit suscipit consequatur. Omnis temporibus repellat error. Pariatur quisquam quod assumenda ut consequatur et porro consequatur. Rerum ea vel soluta iusto doloremque.
- Tasks:** A list of tasks related to the opportunity.
 - Follow-up** **Cindy Cluster**: Donec sit amet ante mauris, at mattis enim. (re: Quibusdam quasi unde) - due now.
 - Email** **>Lorem ipsum dolor sit**: (re: Quibusdam quasi unde) - completed 5 minutes ago
- Contacts:** A list of contacts associated with the opportunity.
 - Franco Sebert** Account Manager at Volkman-Gerhold. `francos@gmail.com` | phone: (427)085-2648 | mobile: (427)085-2644 | added 24 days ago. [Edit] [Delete]
 - Dell Monahan** Executive Assistant at Volkman-Gerhold. `dellm@yahoo.com` | phone: (393)333-3236 | mobile: (393)474-2170 | added about 1 month ago
 - Johnpaul Wurtall** VP of Sales at Volkman-Gerhold. `johnpaulw@gmail.com` | phone: (888)047-8555 | mobile: (408)555-5761 | added 29 days ago

At the bottom left, there is a "Go to # on this page" link.

related work

model finding for checking Java
[Vaziri], [Taghdiri], [Dennis] & co
example: KOA vote tallying program

model checking for web apps
eg, [DeAlfaro], [Castelluccia]
focused on navigation

symbolic security analysis
[Chaudhuri & Foster]

checking Rails data model in Alloy
[Nijjar & Bultan]

#3

security configuration

work by Eunsuk Kang

problem

most security attacks not subtle
badly configured firewall
failure to sanitize queries
missing access controls

but hard to fix
complex configuration settings
interactions between components
changing defaults & behaviors

standard approach

designer of application

relies on experts for component properties

administrator picks conservative settings

eg DISAs 'Security Technical Implementation Guides'

no explicit argument
connecting the components

application-independent
too stringent?
not stringent enough

a sample STIG entry

Group ID (Vulid): V-25277

Group Title: OSX00185-Change Global umask

Rule ID: SV-31351r1_rule

Severity: CAT II

Rule Version (STIG-ID): [OSX00185](#)

Rule Title: OSX00185-Change Global umask

Vulnerability Discussion: The default umask setting of 022 (in octal) removes group and other write permissions. Group members and other users can read and run these files or folders. Changing the umask setting to 027 enables group members to read files and folders and prevents others from accessing the files and folders.

Responsibility: System Administrator


IAControls: ECCD-1, ECCD-2

Check Content:


1. Open a terminal session and enter the following command: `launchctl umask`.
2. Ensure the permission is set to 27. If the permission is not set to 27, then this is a finding.

Fix Text: 1. Open a terminal session and enter the following command: `sudo echo "umask 027" >> /etc/launchd.conf`

architecture



example: Facebook privacy




example: Facebook privacy

Are my private photos only visible to my friends in MIT network?



user


current settings + profile data




Facebook privacy analyzer



undesirable scenarios



new privacy settings



security knowledge base




profile data model




Facebook privacy model

example: Facebook privacy




example: Apache security



example: Apache security

Are my personal files in my website protected?




example: Apache security

Are my personal files in my website protected?

server administrator/user


current config



Apache config analyzer




vulnerabilities



suggested fixes to config

No, directory X is missing index.html, so anyone can view your files

Modify the config to disable directory listing



security knowledge base



network model




config logic




known web server attacks

Directory enumeration by a malicious client


apache configuration model




apache behavior model



apache threat model



sample attack



prototype Apache analyzer

Apache Configuration Analyzer

The Apache Configuration Analyzer started successfully.
An Apache config file successfully loaded.
The document root successfully specified.
Analyzing the input configuration...

Analysis Report

A potential security vulnerability detected in the input configuration!

Security Failure:
The web server exposes the contents of directory \$DOCROOT.

Threat:
A potentially malicious client from "102.169.118.40" issues a request for the listing of directory \$DOCROOT.

Vulnerability:
The global configuration is missing a directive to control the listing of directory contents.

Recommended Mitigation:
Add an "Indexes" option to the global configuration file to disable the listing of directory contents.

The diagram illustrates the directory structure of the Apache web server. At the top is the root directory '/'. Below it are several sub-directories: '/var/www', '/usr/lib/cgi-bin', '/usr/share/doc', and '\$DOCROOT'. The '\$DOCROOT' directory is highlighted in yellow and is the target of a malicious request. A red oval labeled 'Request (Malicious) op: GET' is shown with an arrow labeled 'received' pointing to it from a box labeled 'ApacheWebServer'. A green arrow labeled 'target' points from the request to the '\$DOCROOT' directory, and another green arrow labeled 'source' points from the request to a blue box labeled '102.169.118.40'. Below '\$DOCROOT' are several sub-directories: '\$DOCROOT/dir1', '\$DOCROOT/calendar', '\$DOCROOT/financial', '\$DOCROOT/meetings', and '\$DOCROOT/models'. The '\$DOCROOT/dir1' directory is further expanded to show sub-directories 'nyreports' and '\$DOCROOT/dir1/myfiles1'. All directories are represented by yellow boxes with arrows pointing to their parent directories.

Global configuration file: /etc/apache2/apache2.conf
Document root path: /home/eskang/public_html

related work

SAT-based configuration

firewalls [Margrave (Nelson et al, 10)]

packages [eg, Opium, Mancoosi, Zypp]

rule-based configuration

networks [eg, MulVal (Ou et al., 05)]

model-based diagnosis

[eg, Reiter, Kleer, Williams]

explain symptoms at run-time

summary: 3 provocations

three provocations

relational logic + SAT

cf. “the expressiveness/tractability balance”

focus on failures vs proofs

counterexamples, explanations, fixes

high-level reasoning vs state machine

may scale better & provide better feedback?