The ABCDs of Paxos

Consensus: a set of processes decide on an input value

Main application: Replicated state machines

Paxos asynchronous consensus algorithm

AP Abstract Paxos: generic, non-local version

CP Classic Paxos: stopping failures, compare-and-swap 1989: Lamport, Liskov and Oki

DP Disk Paxos: stopping failures, read-write 1999: Gafni and Lamport

BP Byzantine Paxos: arbitrary failures 1999: Castro and Liskov

The paper and slides are at research.microsoft.com/lampson

Replicated State Machines

Lamport 1978: *Time, clocks and the ordering of events* ... Cast your problem as a deterministic state machine

Takes client input requests for state transitions, called *steps* Performs the steps

Returns the output to the client.

Make *n* copies or 'replicas' of the state machine.

Use consensus to feed all the replicas the same inputs.

Steps must be deterministic, local to replica, atomic (use transactions) Recover by replaying the steps (like transactions) Even a read needs a step, unless the result is "as of step n".

Applications of RSM

Reliable, available data storage system Airplane flight control

Reflexive applications:

Changing quorums of the consensus algorithm

Issuing a *lease*:

A lock on part of the state that times out, hence is fault tolerant

Leaseholder can work on its state without consensus

Like any lock, a lease can have modes or be hierarchical


The Idea of Paxos

A sequence of *views*; get a decision quorum in one of them.

Each view v chooses an anchored value c_v , equal to any earlier decision.

If a quorum *accepts* the choice, decision!

Decision is irrevocable, may be invisible, but is any later view's choice.Choice is changeable, must be visible if there was a decision



Design Methodology

- Communicate only *stable* predicates: once true always true
- Structure the program as a set of atomic actions
- Make actions as non-deterministic as possible: weakest guards Allows more freedom for the implementation Makes it clear what is essential
- Separate safety, liveness, and performance
 Safety first, then strengthen guards for liveness and scheduling
- Abstraction functions and simulation proofs

Notation

Subscripts and superscripts for function arguments: r_v^a for r(v, a)State functions used like variables

Actions described like this:

NameGuardState change $Close_v$ $c_v = nil \land x \in anchor_v$ $\rightarrow c_v := x$

Failure Model

A set *M* of processes (machines)

A *faulty* process can send arbitrary messages: F^m

A stopped process does nothing: S^m

A failed process is faulty or stopped. State freezes after failure.

Limits on failure:

 Z_F = set of sets of processes that can all be faulty Z_S = set of sets of processes that can all be stopped Z_{FS} = set of sets of processes that can all be failed

Examples:

Fail-stop: *n* processes, $Z_F = \{\}, Z_S = Z_{FS} = \text{any set of size} < (n+1)/2$ Byzantine: *n* processes, $Z_F = Z_S = Z_{FS} = \text{any set of size} < (n+1)/3$ Intel-Microsoft: $n_I + n_M$ processes, $Z_F = \text{any subset of one side}$

Quorums and Predicates

Quorum set *Q*: set of sets of processes; *q* in \Rightarrow any superset in. State predicate *g*. Predicate on processes *G*, so *G^m* is a predicate. A *stable* predicate once true remains true.

- *Q*#*G*: A predicate *G* appears to hold in quorum *Q*, $\{m \mid G^m \lor F^m\} \in Q$ Shorthand: $Q[r_v^*=x]$ for Q# $(\lambda m \mid r_v^m = x)$.
- A *good* quorum is not all faulty: $Q_{\sim F} = \{q \mid q \notin Z_F\}$
- $Q_{1} \text{ and } Q_{2} \text{ exclusive: } Q_{1} \text{ quorum for } G \Rightarrow \text{ no } Q_{2} \text{ quorum for its negation.}$ $\text{Means } q_{1} \cap q_{2} \in Q_{\sim F} \text{ for any } q_{1} \text{ and } q_{2}. \text{ Example: size } > (n + f)/2$ $\text{Lift local } r_{v}^{a} = x \Rightarrow \sim (r_{v}^{a} = out) \text{ to global } Q_{1}[r_{v}^{*} = x] \Rightarrow \sim Q_{2}[r_{v}^{*} = out]$ $Q^{+}: \text{ ensures } Q \text{ even after failures: } q^{+} z_{FS} \in Q \text{ for any } q^{+}, z_{FS}$ $\text{A live quorum has } Q^{+} \neq \{\}$

Specification for Consensus

type *X* =... var d : $(X \cup \{nil\}) := nil$ Decision *input* : set $X := \{ \}$

values to decide on

Name Guard State change Input(x)*input* := *input* \cup {*x*} **Decision**: $X d \neq nil$ \rightarrow ret d

Decide $d = nil \land x \in input \rightarrow d := x$


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
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
Abstract Paxos—AP: State



 Q_{dec} and Q_{out} exclusive

var = const is stable for all these except *input*, and $x \in input$ is stable.

AP: Data Flow



Example

	C_{V}	r_v^a	r_v^{b}	r_v^c	C_{v}	r_v^a	$r_v^{\ b}$	r_v^c
View 1	7	7	out	out	8	8	out	out
View 2	8	out	8	out	9	9	out	9
View 3	9	out	out	9	9	out	out	9
input \cap anchor ₄	= {7 ⊇{8	$= \{7, 8, 9\} \text{ seeing } a, b, c$ $\supseteq \{8\} \qquad \text{ seeing } a, b$			{ 9	<pre>{9} no matter what quorum we see</pre>		
	⊇{9)}	seeing	g <i>a</i> , <i>c</i> or <i>b</i> ,	C			

Two runs of AP with agents a, b, c, two agents in a quorum, *input* = $\{7, 8, 9\}$

Anchoring

invariant $r_v = x \land r_u = x' \Rightarrow x = x'$ $= \forall x', u \mid r_v = x \land r_u = x' \Rightarrow x = x'$ $= r_v = x \Rightarrow (\forall u < v, x' \neq x \mid \sim Q_{dec}[r_u^* = x'])$ $\Leftrightarrow r_v = x \Rightarrow (\forall u < v \mid Q_{out}[r_u^* \in \{x, out\}])$ **sfunc** anchor_v

$$= \{x \mid (\forall u < v \mid Q_{out}[r_u^* \in \{x, out\}])\}$$

$$= \{x \mid (\forall w \mid v_0 = w < u \Rightarrow Q_{out}[r_w^* \in \{x, out\}])\}$$

$$= anchor_u$$

$$\cap \{x \mid Q_{out}[r_u^* \in \{x, out\}]\}$$


$$\cap \{x \mid (\forall w \mid u < w < v \Rightarrow Q_{out}[r_w^* \in \{x, out\}])\}$$

$$= X \text{ if } out_{u,v}$$

- = $anchor_u \cap \{x \mid Q_{out}[r_u^* \in \{x, out\}]\})$ if $out_{u,v}$
- \supseteq if $out_{v_{0,v}}$ then X elseif $out_{u,v} \wedge r_u^a = x$ then $\{x\}$ else $\{\}$

where $out_{u,v} = (\forall w \mid u < w < v \Rightarrow r_w = out)$

AP: Algorithm



AP: Liveness

*Choose*_v must see an element of *input* \cap *anchor*_v.

Recall anchor_v

- $= anchor_u \cap \{x \mid Q_{out}[r_u^* \in \{x, out\}]\}$ if $out_{u,v}$
- \supseteq if $out_{v_{0,v}}$ then X elseif $out_{u,v} \wedge r_u^a = x$ then $\{x\}$ else $\{\}$

After $Close_v^a$, an OK agent *a* has $r_u^a \neq nil$ for all u < v.

So if Q_{out} is live, we see either u < v is out, or $r_u^a = x$ for some OK a.

But $r_u^a = c_u \in input \cap anchor_u \checkmark$


If we know *a* is OK, then r_u^a is what we want

With faults (in BP), we might not know. But if $anchor_u$ is visible, that is enough.

Still not live if new views start too fast.

Optimizations

Fixed-size agent state:



Successive steps:

Because $anchor_v$ doesn't depend on *input*, can compute it for lots of steps at once.

This is called a *view change*

One view change is enough for any number of steps

Can batch steps, with one Paxos/batch.

Can run steps in parallel, subject to external consistency.

Disk Paxos—DP

The goal—Replace the conditional writes in *Close* and *Accept* with simple writes.

Accept_v^{*a*} $r_v^a = nil \wedge c_v \neq nil \rightarrow r_v^a := c_v; Close_v^a$

The idea—Replace r_v^a with rx_v^a and ro_v^a . Accept_v^a $c_v \neq nil$ $\rightarrow rx_v^a := c_v; Close_v^a$ Close_v^a active_v \rightarrow for all u < v do $ro_u^a := out$

Proof: Keep r_v^a as a history variable. Abstract it to AP's \underline{r}_v^a . This invariant makes it work (sometimes with an extra view).

$rx_v^a = \wedge$	$ro_v^a = \implies$	r_v^a
nil	nil	= nil
nil	out	= out
X	nil	= x
X	out	≠ nil

Communication

A process has knowledge *T* of stable non-local facts $g@m = (T^m \Rightarrow g)$

We transmit these facts (note that transmitter *k* may be failed):

Transmit^{*k*,*m*}(*g*) $g@k \lor F^k \to T^m := T^m \land (g@k \lor F^k)$ post $(g@k \lor F^k)@m$ A faulty *k* can transmit anything:

A fact known to a $Q_{\sim F}^{+}$ quorum is henceforth known to a $Q_{\sim F}$ quorum of OK agents, and therefore eventually known to everyone.

Broadcast^m(g) $Q_{\sim F}^{+}[g@^*] \wedge OK^m \rightarrow T^m := T^m \wedge g$ post g@m

Implement *Transmit^{k,m}* by sending messages. It's fair if k is OK. This works because the facts are stable.

Classic Paxos—CP

The goal—Tolerate stopped processes


The idea—Agents are the same as in AP. Use a *primary* process to: Implement *Choose* Compute an estimate re_v of r_v Relay facts among the agents Do all the scheduling.

So the primary sends *active*_v to agents to enable $Close_v$, collects r^a , computes *anchor*, gets inputs, does *Choose*, sends c^p to agents, collects r^a again to compute re_v , and sends *d*.

Choose^p $active^{p} \wedge c^{p} = nil \rightarrow c^{p} := x$ $\wedge x \in input^{p} \cap anchor^{p}$

Must have only one c^p per view. Get this with At most one primary per view, and Primary chooses at most once per view

AP and CP



Byzantine Paxos—BP

The goal—Tolerate faulty processes

The idea—To ensure one c_v , a self-exclusive quorum Q_{ch} chooses it

Still have a primary to propose c_v ; an OK agent only chooses this


Primary's proposal should be anchored and input at agents A faulty primary can stop its view from deciding

Every agent needs an estimate ce_v^a of c_v and an estimate re_v^a of r_v

Invariant: The estimates either are *nil* or equal the true values. Every agent also needs its own *input^a*

abstract $\underline{c}_{v} = \mathbf{i}\mathbf{f}$ $Q_{ch}[c_{v}^{*}=x]$ then x else nilsfunc $ce_{v}^{a} = \mathbf{i}\mathbf{f}$ $(Q_{ch}[c_{v}^{*}=x])@a$ then x else nil $anchor_{v}^{a} = anchor_{u} \cap \{x \mid Q_{out}[r_{u}^{*} \in \{x, out\}]@a\}$ $\mathbf{i}\mathbf{f} out_{u,v}^{a}$ $anchor_{v}^{p} = \{x \mid Q_{\sim F}^{+}[x \in anchor_{v}^{*}]@p\}$

CP and BP



Liveness of BP

Choose must see an element of $input \cap anchor_v$. Recall $anchor_v \supseteq anchor_u \cap \{x \mid Q_{out}[r_u^* \in \{x, out\}]\}$ After $Close_v^a$, an OK agent *a* has $r_u^a \neq nil$ for all u < v. So if Q_{out} is live, we see either u < v is out, or $r_u^a = x$ for some OK *a*. But $r_u^a = c_u \in input \cap anchor_u$

Unfortunately, we don't know whether a is OK.

But we do have $Q_{ch}[c_u^*=x]$, hence $Q_{ch}[(x \in anchor_u)@a]$

So if Q_{ch} is live, $x \in anchor_u$ is broadcast, which is enough.

So either we eventually see all previous views out, or we see $x \in anchor_u$ and all views between *u* and *v* out.

A faulty client can wreck a view by not sending input to all agents.

Conclusion

Paxos is a practical protocol for fault-tolerant asynchronous consensus.

Paxos is efficient in replicated state machines, which are the best mechanism for most fault-tolerant systems.

Paxos works in a sequence of views,

Each view chooses a value and then seeks a decision quorum.

A later view chooses any possible earlier decision

Abstract Paxos chooses a consensus value non-locally, and then decides by local actions of the agents.

The agents are read-modify-write memories.

Disk Paxos generalizes this to read-write memories.

Classic Paxos uses a primary process to choose.

Byzantine Paxos uses a primary to propose, a quorum to choose.